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INTRODUCTION
In the well-known fairy tale of rags to riches, a poor
hardworking girl is transformed into a princess with the help of
her fairy godmother and her magic wand. In the European
enlargement version of this fairy tale, the girl is the Western
Balkan countries, the fairy godmother is the European
Commission, and the magic wand is the Copenhagen criteria
and the policy of conditionality. Unlike the head-to-toe princess
transformation that takes a simple tap of the fairy godmother’s
wand, the accession process for Western Balkan countries
consists of a drawn-out, do-it-yourself reform process that only
leads to piecemeal transformation.
On July 1, 2013, Croatia became the twenty-eighth member
of the European Union, a process that took a decade to
complete. 1 Amidst celebration, however, the message that
rippled through Western Balkan nations was two-fold and
contradictory: (1) the European Union continues to be
committed to the region, and Western Balkan countries can
work to mirror Croatia’s success, but (2) the European Union is

1 . See Croatia Celebrates on Joining EU, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2013), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23118035 (reporting that after ten years since its
application for membership, Croatia became the twenty-eigth Member of the European
Union); see also Honor Mahony, Croatia Becomes 28th EU Member State, EU OBSERVER
(July 1, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://euobserver.com/enlargement/120688 (noting that
Croatia became a Member of the European Union a decade after starting the accession
process).
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developing “enlargement fatigue” from the accession of new
countries and is wary of further expansion.2
Conscious of the fact that countries lose the initiative to
continue the necessary reforms once they become members, the
European Union has made the path to accession more
demanding. 3 In June 2003, the European Council of
Thessaloniki reiterated its resolve to support the Western Balkan
countries in their accession to the European Union. 4 The
Council clarified that the Stabilization and Association
Agreements (“SAAs”), outlining the new conditions necessary
for membership under the Stabilization and Association Process
(“SAP”), would serve as the primary contractual agreements
guiding the membership process. 5 For Western Balkan
2. See Paula M. Pickering, The Constraints on European Institution’s Conditionality in
the Western Balkans, 63 EUR. ASIA STUD. 1939, 1941 (2011) (noting that many EU
Member States are suffering from enlargement fatigue which affects their commitment
to West Balkan states other than Croatia); Naftali Bendavid, Fule Says the EU Should
Expand Further, But With Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/
brussels/2013/10/16/fule-says-the-eu-should-expand-further-but-with-care/ (discussing
the progress made by West Balkan countries towards accession and the “enlargement
fatigue” developed by some of EU leaders); see also EU Enlargement: The Next Seven, BBC
NEWS (July 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616 (explaining
that Croatia’s accession was seen as a strong signal of EU commitment to the region,
but also citing surveys suggesting widespread enlargement fatigue in Europe).
3. See John O’Brennan & Esmeralda Gassie, From Stabilization to Consolidation:
Albanian State Capacity and Adaptation to European Union Rules, 11 J. BALKAN & NEAR E.
STUD. 61, 61 (2009) (arguing that attitudes regarding enlargement have hardened and
EU conditionality requires that Western Balkan countries reform prior to
membership); see also Mahony, supra note 1, para. 6 (noting that the path to joining the
European Union has become more exacting); Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013–2014,
COM (2013) 700 final, at 2 (Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Enlargement Strategy 2013–
2014] (acknowledging that the accession process is more rigorous and comprehensive
than in the past).
4. See Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council (June 19 & 20,
2003) (reiterating the Council’s determination to fully and effectively support the
European perspective of the Western Balkan countries once they meet the established
criteria); see also Florian Trauner, From Membership Conditionality to Policy
Conditionality: EU External Governance in South-Eastern Europe, Address at the
European Union Consent Conference 6 (Nov. 16–17, 2007) (stating that at the
European Council of Thessaloniki, the Council endorsed the Thessaloniki agenda of
European integration for Western Balkan countries).
5. See Arolda Elbasani, EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Strategies of Borrowing
and Inventing, 10 J. S. EUR. & BALKANS 293, 302–03 (2008) (discussing the attempt of
the Thessaloniki Summit to strengthen the association of EU policies in Western
Balkans and to identify the Stabilization and Association Agreements (“SAAs”) as the
only contractual agreement for EU membership); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–
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countries, this means a long and challenging climb to EU
accession with additional membership conditions set out in the
SAAs that serve as prerequisites to the satisfaction of the
standard EU membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen
criteria.6
Croatia is the first EU acceding country to complete the
SAP through adherence to the prerequisite requirements of the
SAA and Copenhagen criteria.7 As such, Croatia may serve as a
model for other Western Balkan countries in their road to EU
accession.8 Among these countries is Albania, which formally
began the EU accession process on June 12, 2006, after signing
an SAA with the European Union.9 While attempting to emulate
Croatia as a model for this process, Albania has encountered
delays, with the SAA and negotiation process taking three years
to complete.10 Additionally, Albania has not yet been granted
candidate status for EU membership, which is typically granted
2014, supra note 3, at 1 (reiterating that at the Thessaloniki Summit the Western
Balkan countries were granted a clear path to EU membership subject to fulfillment of
the Copenhagen criteria and Stabilization and Association Process conditions).
6. Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (stating that
in the case of Western Balkans countries, additional conditions for membership are set
out in the SAAs); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (affirming
all Western Balkan countries were granted EU membership subject to fulfillment of
Copenhagen criteria and the conditions of the Stabilization and Association Process).
7 . See Dejan Jovic, Croatian EU Membership and the Future of the Balkans, in
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
201, 208 (Vedran Dzihic & Daniel Hamilton ed., 2012) (noting Croatia’s integration
into the European Union after completing the Stabilization and Association Process
(“SAP”) process); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (stating
that Croatia was the first country to complete the SAP).
8. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 208 (suggesting that Croatia’s successful integration
into the European Union is likely to encourage other candidates and potential
candidates); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that
Croatia serves as an example of the positive effect of the enlargement process).
9. See Anduena Gjevori, The Rights of Albanian Nationals Under the Stabilization and
Association Agreement Between Albania and the European Communities, 4 MEDITERRANEAN J.
SOC. SCI. 439, 440 (2013) (stating that the SAA between Albania and the European
Union was signed on June 12, 2006); see also Key Dates to Albania’s Path Towards the EU,
DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO ALBANIA, http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/albania/eu_albania/political_relations/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2013) (listing the key dates for Albania’s progress towards becoming an EU Member).
10. See EU Enlargement: The Next Seven, supra note 2 (noting that Albania’s
negotiations for the SAA took three and a half years to complete which was three times
longer than it took for Croatia); see also Gjevori, supra note 9, at 440 (stating that the
SAA for Albania entered into force for compliance on April 1, 2009).
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early on in the accession process.11 It was only recommended for
candidate status in October 2013, seven years after beginning
this process.12
In light of this discussion, Part I of this Comment briefly
reviews the process of accession to the European Union,
outlining the key criteria necessary for membership under the
Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen criteria. Part I also
examines the SAP and the additional conditions imposed by the
SAAs on Western Balkan countries. Part II analyzes the SAP in
context through a comparison of the accession processes for
Croatia and Albania. Part II then assesses the application of the
prerequisite criteria and the Copenhagen criteria in each case.
Finally, Part III argues that the willingness to allow Western
Balkan countries to begin this process is undermined by the lack
of a defined timeline for the fulfillment of the accession criteria
and the strict adherence to the conditions of the SAAs as a
prerequisite to membership. This creates disillusionment with
this process, as the road to EU accession seems arbitrarily slow
and laborious for candidate states. Instead, the European Union
should adhere to a transparent and accountable process, and
employ the power imbalance created through its policy of
conditionality to effect the necessary change in the Western
Balkan countries.
I. THE CRITERIA FOR EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE PROCESS
OF ACCESSION FOR WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES
Part I.A reviews the historical development of the EU
accession process and the key criteria that must be met by
11 . See Memorandum from the European Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council 1, MEMO/13/888 (Oct. 16, 2013) (indicating the first
recommendation made by the Commission that Albania be granted candidate status);
see also Progres-Raporti i KE Rekomandon: Shqiperise t’i Jepet Statusi. Ja 5 Prioritetet,
BALKANWEB, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/ke-publikonprogres-raportin-2013-rekomandon-shqiperise-ti-jepet-statusi-153849.html
(reporting
that the European Commission finally recommended Albania for candidate status).
12 . See Memorandum from the European Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, supra note 11 (recommending that Albania be granted EU
candidate status on condition that it continues its fight against organized crime and
corruption); see also Progres-Raporti i KE Rekomandon: Shqiperise t’i Jepet Statusi. Ja 5
Prioritetet, supra note 11 (reporting that Albania was recommended for candidate status
in the Commission’s 2013 progress report).
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candidate states for EU membership. Part I.B details the
accession process for Western Balkan countries in light of the
SAP framework and the unique characteristics of the Western
Balkan region.
A. The Development of the EU Accession Process
In 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome,
establishing the present day European Union. 13 Since its
inception, the European Union has undergone a number of
enlargements, the most recent being the accession of Croatia to
create twenty-eight EU Member States.14 In 1992, the Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”), known as the Maastricht Treaty,
established that any European country respecting the core
principles of the Treaty could apply for EU membership. 15
These core principles include liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.16
In 1993, recognizing the need for evaluation guidelines, the
European Council meeting in Copenhagen expanded the
formal requirements for EU membership, creating the
Copenhagen criteria.17 This criteria for membership is assessed
by the European Commission and includes: (1) political
criteria—stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law,
13. See KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21344, EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT 2 (2013) (reporting that in 1957, six European Coal and Steel
Community Members, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West
Germany, signed the Treaty of Rome which became known as the European Union);
see also Huguette Laermans & Paul Roosens, The Enlargement of the European Union, 18
EKONOMSKA MISAO PRAKSA 397, 398 (2009) (stating that six countries signed the Treaty
of Rome in 1957 starting the EEC, now called the European Union).
14 . See Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://
europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013)
(providing a list of current EU Member States totaling 28 Member States following
Croatia’s accession); see also Archick, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that Croatia’s accession
brought the Union to 28 Member States).
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, 2012 O.J. C
326/13, at 70 [hereinafter TEU]; see also ARCHICK, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that
according to the Maastricht Treaty, any European country could apply for EU
membership if it met certain political and economic criteria)
16. TEU, supra note 15, art. 6(1), 2012 O.J. C 326/13, at 19.
17. See generally European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency
(Jun. 21–22, 1993), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (focusing on the decisions made by the Copenhagen
European Council regarding the accession process).
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human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2)
economic criteria—a functioning market economy able to cope
with the competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union; and (3) legal criteria—a candidate country’s ability to
undertake the obligations of membership and implement the
acquis communautaire.18 The acquis communautaire consists of the
binding body of common rights and obligations applicable to all
EU Member States that must be acquired by candidate states in
order to become EU members.19 The lack of clear definitions for
the material terms of the Copenhagen criteria has been
criticized as problematic given the potential for its inconsistent
application. 20 Nevertheless, the ensuing Parts explore the
general understanding of each criterion that has developed over
the years through application.
1. Political Criteria
The Copenhagen political criteria can be divided into two
major branches: (1) democracy and the rule of law, and (2)
human rights and respect and protection of minorities. In
evaluating the political criteria, the Commission looks primarily

18. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22, 1993);
see Tanja A. Borzel & Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY,
AND THE RULE OF LAW, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (Apr. 27, 2005) http://www.eunewgov.org/database/PUBLIC/P23000-02-CLU302_One_size_fits_all.pdf (listing the
three conditions for EU membership established by the Copenhagen European
Council of 1993). The acquis communautaire consists of the binding body of common
rights and obligations applicable to all EU Member States that must be acquired by
candidate states in order to become EU members.
19 . Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council (Dec. 15–16, 1995)
(noting the added requirement for candidate countries to acquire the acquis
communautaire before EU membership); see Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are
They Helping or Hurting the European Union, 14 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 390, 392–93 (2011)
(noting that the Madrid European Council added the acquis requirement to achieve
uniform legislation throughout the European Union).
20. See Rezler, supra note 19, at 396 (arguing that the lack of definitions for the
Copenhagen criteria can lead to inconsistent interpretations of the conditions applied
to candidate countries); see also Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 199, 203 (2005) (arguing that the concepts forming the Copenhagen criteria are
“notoriously vague” and the impression imparted by the criteria is “one of critical
vagueness”); Tanja Marktler, The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR.
L. & POL’Y 343, 348 (2006) (noting the difficulty in ascertaining the meaning and
application of the Copenhagen criteria).
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at the democracy and the rule of law branch of this inquiry.21 An
evaluation of democracy and the rule of law encompasses a
number of factors, including elections, separation of powers
among the branches of government, and anti-corruption
measures.22 A country vying for EU membership must undertake
the necessary measures to ensure free and fair multiparty
elections and to include opposition parties in parliamentary
appointments.23 The executive branch of the candidate country
must also have a unified system of civil service, a decentralized
and
reformed
administration,
accountability,
and
transparency.24 The Commission emphasizes the importance of
a stable and independent judiciary branch, composed of capable
judges who can handle cases efficiently, which in practice has
translated into greater weight placed on this element during the
evaluation of applicant countries.25 Similarly, the Commission

21. See Marktler, supra note 20, at 351 (stating that the Commission combines
democracy and rule of law in its evaluation); see also Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen
Criteria and Their Progeny, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 1, 3 (Christophe
Hillion ed., 2004) (noting that the Copenhagen political criteria is based on principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of
law).
22. See Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Structure and Meaning
of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and The Rule of Law, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION
ONLINE PAPERS 1, 14 (2004) (identifying five main areas of scrutiny related to the
assessment of the democracy and rule of law criterion: elections, the functioning of the
legislature, the functioning of the executive, the functioning of the judiciary, and anticorruption measures); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 349–51 (noting that under the
democracy and rule of law criterion, major attention is given to elections, the
functioning of the executive, judiciary, and legislature, and corruption).
23. See Geoffrey Pridham, EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post–
Communist States—Formality and Reality, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 953, 960 (2002)
(indicating that the necessary measures for democracy and rule of law include holding
municipal elections, an institution of direct elections for state president, and the
involvement of opposition parties in parliamentary appointments); see also Kochenov,
supra note 22, at 14–16 (stating that the Copenhagen political criteria may be satisfied
by “free and fair elections,” a Parliament that operates satisfactorily, is respected, has
an opposition partaking in its activities, and allows for minority representation).
24. See Marktler, supra note 20, at 350–51 (noting the importance of adequate
management, effectiveness, and executive transparency for democracy and the rule of
law); see also Kochenov, supra note 22, at 18 (listing the main issues that the
Commission focuses on in assessing the executive branch of a candidate country).
25. See, e.g., Albania 2012 Progress Report, at 11, SWD (2012) 334 final (Oct. 10,
2012) (outlining the factors generally used to assess the efficiency of the judiciary in a
candidate country); see also Kochenov, supra note 22, at 20 (providing a list of factors
considered in assessing the functionality of a candidate country’s judiciary, including
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requires that effective anti-corruption measures be in place as
part of this inquiry.26 This component of the political criterion
aims to combat the widespread corruption plaguing the
governments of applicant countries which include Serbia,
Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania.27
The Copenhagen political criterion also includes the
Commission’s evaluation of human rights and minority
protection in the candidate country. 28 The human rights
element is based on an evaluation of a country’s fundamental
human rights and international agreements on human rights.29
The respect and protection of minorities, on the other hand,
focuses on the ratification and implementation of the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, the first legally binding multilateral instrument
pertaining to the general protection of national minorities.30

the independence of the branch and the effective enforcement of the court’s
decisions).
26. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 24 (indicating that the last element of the
structure of the Copenhagen political criterion of democracy and the rule of law relates
to anti-corruption measures); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 351 (indicating that
corruption is an element under the principles of democracy and the rule of law).
27. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 25 (noting that the Commission recognizes
the widespread corruption in candidate countries in various sectors); see also Marktler,
supra note 20, at 351 (noting the widespread corruption in candidate countries).
28. See European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, at 8–9, SEC (2011)
1200 final (Oct. 12, 2011) (indicating human rights and the protection of minorities
are elements considered by the Commission under the Copenhagen political
criterion); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (noting that human rights and
minority protection also fall within the Copenhagen political criterion).
29. See generally European Parliament, Democracy and Respect for Human Rights in
the Enlargement Process of the European Union, Briefing No. 20 (Apr. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/pdf/20a1_en.pdf
(noting
accession to the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and freedom of expression and association are some of
the fundamental human rights assessed under the Copenhagen political criterion);
Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (indicating that generally accepted fundamental rights
and international agreements are used by the Commission in their assessment of
candidate countries’ compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria).
30 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (discussing the need for candidate
countries to implement the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities); see also Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and Explanatory Report, H(95)10 pmbl. (Feb. 1995), available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/
PDF_H(95)10_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf (explaining the intention of the
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Particular importance is placed on the protection of the Roma
minority, which is discriminated against in many candidate
countries.31
2. Economic Criteria
The Copenhagen economic criterion is also a twofold
inquiry, requiring candidate countries to have (1) functioning
market economies, and (2) the capacity to cope with
competition and market forces within the European Union by
the date of accession.32 Under the condition for a functioning
market economy, the Commission monitors a number of subcriteria, such as macroeconomic stability, free interplay of
market forces, and an adequate legal system for regulating the
economy in the applicant country.33 The second sub-condition,
the ability to cope with competition and market forces within
the European Union, is assessed on the basis of factors which
include the existence of a market economy, trade and
investment integration with the European Union, and adequate

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as a legally binding
instrument concerned with the protection of national minorities).
31. See European Commission, Support for the Roma and Communities in Central and
Eastern Europe 4, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/brochure_roma_oct2003_
en.pdf (stating that the situation of minorities such as the Roma is “taken into
consideration in assessing the capacity of candidate countries to become Members of
the European Union”); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 352 (noting the lack of
progress by candidate countries in implementing the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities especially with regards to the Roma minority).
32. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013)
(explaining that the Copenhagen economic criteria requires acceding countries to be
functioning market economies, and “to have, by the date of accession, the capacity to
cope with competition and market forces within the EU”); European Commission,
Progress Towards Meeting the Economic Criteria for EU Accession: The EU Commission’s 2012
Assessments, in EUROPEAN ECONOMY 1, OCCASIONAL PAPERS 122 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/
ocp122_en.pdf [hereinafter European Economy] (identifying the existence of “a
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure
and market forces within the Union” as the Copenhagen economic criteria).
33. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, supra note 32 (listing
the sub-criteria required for being a functional market economy); see also European
Economy, supra note 32, at 2 (providing the sub-criteria applied by the Commission in
examining the existence of a functional market economy); Marktler, supra note 20, at
353 (citing the elements taken into consideration by the Commission in assessing a
functional market economy).
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sectorial and enterprise structures.34 The Commission’s inquiry
into these subcategories is intended to provide a snapshot of the
viability of the applicant country’s economy.35
3. Legal/Acquis Criteria
Finally, the Commission assesses a candidate country’s legal
system and ability to take on the legal obligations of EU
membership and to adopt, implement, and enforce the acquis
comunautaire. 36 The acquis is defined as the binding body of
common rights and obligations applicable to all EU Member
States. 37 Within this penumbra of EU laws fall all treaties,
directives, regulations, decisions, declarations and resolutions,
international agreements, and the judgments of the European
Court of Justice.38 In fulfilling the Copenhagen acquis criterion,
a candidate country must undergo legal affinity by both

34. See European Commission, Economic Accession Criteria, supra note 32 (providing
a list of what is required to be competitive in the European Union); see European
Economy, supra note 32, at 2 (explaining in greater detail the factors used to assess a
country’s capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the
European Union); Marktler, supra note 20, at 354 (citing the definition used by the
Commission in determining a country’s capacity to withstand competitive pressure and
market forces within the European Union).
35. See Marktler, supra note 20 (describing the subcategories of the elements used
to evaluate an applicant country’s economy); see also European Economy, supra note 32
(noting some of the factors used to assess the capacity of an applicant country’s
capacity economy).
36. See Christen B. Jacobsen, Implementing the Acquis Communautaire – The Fight
Over 80.000 Pages 5 (Riga Graduate Sch. L., Working Paper No. 7, 2002) (noting that
all candidate countries must formally accept the acquis communautaire and demonstrate
the capacity to become constructive and loyal EU Members); see also Hillion, supra note
21, at 8 (explaining that the applicant country has to demonstrate the ability to take on
the obligations of membership, which entail the acceptance and observance of the
acquis communautaire).
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/
37 Enlargement—Acquis,
EUROPEAN
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013)
(defining acquis as “the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all
the European Union Member States”); see Vaughne Miller, The EU’s Acquis
Communautaire, SN/IA/5944, at 2 (Apr. 26, 2011) (noting that the acquis is the
accumulated body of EU law and obligations from 1958 to date).
38. See Enlargement—Acquis, supra note 37 (listing what the European Union
acquis comprises of); see also Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 6–7 (dividing the acquis into
fifteen different groups and identifying the wide variety of EU laws that fall within each
group).
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accepting the evolving nature of EU law and making EU law part
of, and superior to, national law.39
The Commission has divided all current EU rules into
thirty-five different policy fields, known as chapters. 40 The
chapters provide the rules of regulation within the European
Union, from the free movement of goods, workers, services, and
capital, to company law and science and research.41 For each
chapter, the applicant country must negotiate the conditions
and timing of the adoption, implementation, and enforcement
of the rules within the country.42 The candidate countries are
required to adopt the acquis in its entirety, but can negotiate
about when and how each chapter shall be implemented during
the accession process.43 The Commission analyzes the applicant
country’s legal system through a process called screening,
determines when each chapter should be adopted, and later
closes each chapter after the relevant area of EU law fully
implemented into the applicant’s national legal structure. 44
39. See Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 7 (explaining that candidate countries must
accept the dynamic nature of EU law and that EU law takes priority over national law);
see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 355 (noting the importance that the Commission has
given to the effective incorporation of community legislation into national legislation
by candidate countries).
40. Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (stating that the acquis is divided into 35
different policy fields); see also Miller, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that in preparing to
join the European Union, acceding states must accept all the existing acquis which
covers 35 policy areas).
41 Chapters of the Acquis, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (listing all 35 chapters of the acquis and providing a brief
summary of what each chapter entails); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note
28, at 25–66 (providing a list and analysis of all the chapters used to assess Croatia’s
ability to assume the obligations of membership).
42. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the conditions and
timing for the candidate’s adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis is
negotiated by chapter); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 354–55 (discussing the
negotiation process for candidate countries in adopting the European Union acquis).
43. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (stating that the chapters themselves
are not negotiable but the “candidates essentially agree on how and when to adopt and
implement them”); see also The Accession Process for a New Member State, EUROPA, http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/
l14536_en.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (providing an overview of the negotiation
process for candidate countries).
44. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (noting that the
Council decides unanimously on the opening of a chapter and the benchmarks on the
basis of the Commission’s recommendations); see also Steps Towards Joining,

2014]

FROM RAGS TO RICHES

1695

Failure to adopt substantial reforms or discontinued efforts by
the candidate country in meeting the benchmarks for a chapter
can cause a closed chapter to reopen and suspension of open
chapters.45 Otherwise, once the applicant country accepts the
acquis and adopts each chapter necessary for accession into their
national legal system, an Accession Treaty is signed to complete
this process.46
B. The “Uniqueness” and Accession Process of the Western Balkan
Countries
The European Union’s interest in the Western Balkan
transition after the fall of Communism spurred aspirations of
political and economic growth in the region, while providing
the European Union with a way to achieve stability and
diplomacy among these contentious states.47 The result was the
development and implementation of a regional approach by the
European Union towards the Western Balkans, a region
encompassing Albania and all the former Yugoslavian states,
with the exception of Slovenia.48 This regional approach was
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2013) (providing a detailed explanation of the process of negotiation).
45. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (stating that a
chapter can be reopened if the reforms are deemed insufficient); see also Steps Towards
Joining, supra note 44 (noting that the Commission can reopen closed chapters if it is
no longer satisfied with the candidate country’s progress in that policy field).
46. See The Accession Process for a New Member State, supra note 43 (explaining that
the Accession Treaty is signed when the Commission considers the candidate country’s
reforms sufficient); see also Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (stating that even after
the signing of the Accession Treaty, an acceding country must continue reforms to
ensure that everything is completed before the Treaty becomes final and binding).
47. See LUCIA VESNIC-ALUJEVIC, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF WESTERN BALKANS:
FROM RECONCILIATION TO EUROPEAN FUTURE 19 (2012), available at
http://thinkingeurope.eu/sites/default/files/publicationfiles/european_integration_of_western_balkans.pdf (observing that the European
Union’s primary interest was in stabilizing the region since each country expressed
interest in joining the European Union); see also Borzel & Risse, supra note 18, at 10
(suggesting that given the European Union’s earlier success in consolidating
democratic transition through enlargement as a transformation tool, membership
conditionality was employed as an instrument to stabilize the Western Balkans region
which the European Union considers vital to its geopolitical interests).
48. See Council Regulation 533/2004, 2004 O.J. L 86/1 (identifying Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the countries that compose the Western Balkans for
SAP framework); see also Aleksandar Kostadinov, FDI Performance Index of Western Balkan

1696 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1683
adopted during the Helsinki Council and became known as the
SAP. 49 Part I.B analyzes the accession process as applied to
Western Balkan countries through the SAP framework. This Part
then places the SAP in context by exploring the “uniqueness” of
the Western Balkan region.
1. The Accession Process for Western Balkan Countries
The SAP creates extra requirements for accession vis-à-vis
applicant countries from the Western Balkan region. It is guided
primarily by the principle of conditionality, under which the
European Union reserves the right to unilaterally impose
sanctions and provide incentives in response to a candidate
country’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and EU
conditions. 50 Thus, the conditionality of the SAP allows the
European Union to singlehandedly control the pace of the
accession process in Western Balkan states.51
The SAP has three central aims: (1) political stability and
swift transition to a market economy; (2) regional cooperation;
and (3) the likelihood of EU membership.52 To achieve these
Countries, 1 ANALYTICA J. 18 (2008) (stating that the Western Balkan refers to Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro).
49. Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, Sticks and Norms: The EU and Regional Cooperation in
Southeast Europe, 8 J. S. EUR. & BALKANS 27, 35 (2006) (stating that the Helsinki Council
decided to replace its Regional Approach with the SAP); see Elbasani, supra note 5, at
295-99 (outlining the history and development of the Regional Approach into the SAP
for the Western Balkan countries).
50. See Liu Zuokui, EU’s Conditionality and the Western Balkans’ Accession Roads, 2 J.
ON EUR. PERSP. W. BALKANS 79, 83–84 (defining positive and negative conditionality
policy employed by the European Union in achieving its objectives in the Western
Balkan countries); see also Enik Pogace, Examining European Community Law
Principles in a New Legal Context: Placing the Stabilization and Association Agreement
Under the Constitutional Legal Framework of Albania 1, 10 (Queen Mary Sch. L. Legal
Stud., 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732546
(noting that conditionality has been engraved into the Copenhagen criteria by
providing incentives or restraints for candidate states to become EU Members).
51. See Gorica Atanasova, Does Europeanization Equal Democratisation?, 1 ANALYTICA
J. 1, 6–7 (2008) (noting the asymmetry in power over the process that arises out of
conditionality); see also Heather Grabbe, Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty
in the EU Accession Process, in THE POLITICS OF EUROPEANIZATION 303, (Kevin
Featherstone & Claudio M. Radaelli eds., 2003) (arguing that conditionality gives the
European Union greater control over the accession process).
52. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, at 2–4, COM (2005) 561 final (Nov. 9,
2005) (setting forth the European Union’s enlargement policy and insisting on the
principle of conditionality for Western Balkan countries); Steps Towards Joining, supra
note 44 (presenting the aims of the SAP).
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aims and incentivize Western Balkan countries’ compliance with
SAA requirements, the European Union employs a number of
different tactics. For example, the European Union may employ
trade concessions in the form of duty-free access to EU markets,
economic and financial assistance through its Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance (“IPA”), reconstruction, stabilization
and development assistance, and, most importantly, SAAs, to
meet the requirements of the SAP.53
Moreover, SAAs provide both a legal and institutional
framework for the accession process. On the one hand, they
regulate relations between the Member States and the candidate
country by functioning as a contractual relationship with legal
effects under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”).54 On the other hand, they provide
for mechanisms and bodies charged with the implementation,
administration, and monitoring of all areas covered by the
SAA.55 The SAA covers a multitude of legal areas that are divided
into ten titles that includes political dialogue, regional
cooperation, free movement of goods and workers, and
financial cooperation. 56 Upon receipt of an application for
membership by a candidate country, the Commission issues a

53. See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (listing the instrumentalities employed
by the European Union in guiding Western Balkan countries through the SAP); see also
Bechev, supra note 49, at 35–36 (noting that the European Union agreed under the
SAP framework to open its markets to allow Western Balkan countries duty-free access
and to provide economic and financial assistance).
54. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 218, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 144–46 [hereinafter TFEU]; see Gjevori, supra
note 10, at 440 (noting that the SAAs are EU association agreements that have legal
effects in different legal orders under Article 218 of the TFEU); see also Pogace, supra
note 50, at 17 (indicating that the SAA represents a contractual relation and a legal
instrument between the European Union and the candidate country under Article 310
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which is not Article 218 of the
TFEU).
55. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 16 (discussing the SAA between Albania and the
European Union); see also Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Signature of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and its Member
States and the Republic of Croatia on Behalf of the European Community, COM (2001) 371
final (Sep. 9, 2001) [hereinafter SAA between European Community and Croatia]
(providing an example of an SAA).
56. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 16 (listing the titles that are included in the SAA
between Albania and the European Union); see also SAA between European Community
and Croatia, supra note 57 (providing a more extensive list of the titles it contains).
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formal recommendation and feasibility report to the European
Council on whether to sign an SAA.57
The SAA leads the accession process when it enters into
force and only lapses when a candidate country obtains EU
membership.58 Within its framework, the Commission designates
short and medium-term priorities for the candidate country to
implement during the accession process in order to meet the
accession criteria.59 In this regard, the SAAs have become a key
part of the pre-accession phase and the Commission presents to
the Council its opinion on whether the applicant country should
be granted candidate status based on the country’s positive
progress towards implementing the SAA.60
For Western Balkan countries, the road to the European
Union begins with the submission of a formal application to join
the European Union, triggering a sequence of evaluation
procedures.61 The candidate country then proceeds to negotiate
57. See Archick, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating that the Commission issues a
formal opinion on the aspirant country, after which the Council decides whether to
accept the application); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 10
(stating that the Commission can recommend to the Council in a feasibility report
whether and under what conditions the SAA negotiations should begin).
58. Council Regulation 533/2004, on the Establishment of European Partnerships
in the Framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, 2004 O.J. L 86/1 (stating
that the SAA provides the framework for the Western Balkan country’s accession
process until their integration into the European Union).
59. See Bruno S. Sergi & Qerim Qerimi, The Process of EU Enlargement Towards
South-Eastern Europe: Current Challenges and Perspectives, 2007 SOUTH-EAST EUR. REV.
LAB. & SOC. AFF. 57, 58 (2007) (describing the Accession Partnership and explaining
that a candidate country must fulfill short-term and medium-term priorities designated
by the Union in order to make progress towards meeting the accession criteria); see also
Qerim Qerimi, South-east Europe’s EU Integration: Dreams and Realities, 2002 SOUTH-EAST
EUR. REV. LAB. & SOC. AFF. 43, 45 (2002) (noting that the Union indicates short- and
medium-term priorities for the candidate country to implement in making progress
towards fulfilling the accession criteria).
60. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 10 (indicating that upon
proper implementation of the SAA, a country can move to the next phases of candidate
status and then accession negotiations); see also European Commission, EU Enlargement
Fact Sheet, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/factsheet_
en.pdf (documenting the main steps to EU accession and noting that if the
Commission has a favorable opinion of the applicant country’s status, the Council may
decide to consider the applicant a candidate country).
61. See On the Path to EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, EU INSIGHT 2
(Dec. 2010) (noting that a country starts the process for EU membership by submitting
an application resulting in a number of evaluations); see also ARCHICK, supra note 13, at
5 (explaining that when a country submits an application to join the European Union,
it triggers a complex process of evaluation).
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an SAA, which determines the specific conditions that must be
met by that country along with the Copenhagen criteria.62 As
mentioned, the SAA imposes specific requirements for the
member state and does not cover all of the conditions and
criteria for EU membership, thus the Commission closely
monitors a candidate country’s compliance with both the SAA
conditions and the Copenhagen criteria.63 Compliance under
the SAA and Copenhagen criteria typically occurs in stages, with
the Commission submitting its evaluations through annual
progress reports to the European Council and the European
Parliament.64
An applicant is granted candidate status at some point
during this evaluation of its progress in meeting the SAA and
Copenhagen criteria, and later enters accession negotiations.65 A
satisfactory conclusion of negotiations leads to the submission of
the Draft Accession Treaty for approval of the Council, the
Commission, and the European Parliament. 66 The approved
treaty is signed and submitted to all Member States and the
candidate country for ratification in accordance with their
62. See Benjamin Rey, Fact Sheets on the European Union – The Western Balkans,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.2.html (describing the accession
process under the SAP framework for Western Balkan countries); see also Croatia:
Stabilisation and Association Agreement Negotiations with Croatia Concluded, IP/01/688
(May 14, 2001) (discussing the SAA negotiations between Croatia and the European
Union).
63. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the Commission
closely monitors compliance with the SAA and the Copenhagen criteria); see also Borzel
& Risse, supra note 18, at 11 (stating that the Commission monitored and reported the
progress of each candidate).
64. See Conditions for Membership, supra note 6 (noting that the Commission
keeps the Council and European Parliament informed throughout the process by
submitting regular reports, strategy papers, and clarifications on conditions for further
progress); see also Borzel & Risse, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that the Commission
reported on the progress of each candidate country and made recommendations for
improvements in an annual report presented to the European Council).
65. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing the negotiation
process once a candidate country enters the negotiations stage).
66. See On the Path to EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, supra note 63
(indicating that after negotiations are concluded to the satisfaction of both sides, a
Draft Accession Treaty is submitted for approval to the Council of the European
Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament); see also EU
Enlargement Fact Sheet, supra note 62 (stating that the accession treaty must be approved
by the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European
Parliament).
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respective constitutional rules.67 Finally, the candidate country
becomes an EU Member State on the date specified in the
treaty.68
2. Why the Western Balkan Region Presents a Unique Case
The collapse of Communism and the violent disintegration
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia saw the emergence of new
polarized and variegated nation states plagued by limited
democratic experience, weak institutions that impeded politicoeconomic progress, and dysfunctional economies. 69 Realizing
the new nations’ need for guidance, the European Union
undertook significant efforts to sustain the regional transition to
multiparty democracies and market economies. 70 The slow
reform process and the lack of cooperation within the Western
Balkan region, however, earned the region the label of Europe’s
“black hole.”71 The effective implementation of the European
Union’s regional approach required the European Union to
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the process for an
accession treaty between the candidate country and the Member States).
68. See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 44 (stating that a candidate country
becomes a full EU Member on the date laid down in the treaty); see also On the Path to
EU Membership: The EU Enlargement Process, supra note 63 (indicating that the candidate
country becomes an EU Member State once the treaty enters into force on its
scheduled date).
69. See Leeda Demetropoulou, Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU
Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe, 3 SOUTHEAST EUR. POL.
87, 87–88 (2002) (describing the effects that the collapse of Communism and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia had on the Balkan region); see also Panagiotou, supra note
54, at 358–59 (illustrating the impact of communism and its aftermath in Albania as an
example of the transition for other countries in the Balkan region).
70. See Sergi & Qerimi, supra note 61, at 61 (observing that following the postcommunism changes that took place in the Balkan region the European Union
undertook a series of measures to ensure the continued transition to multiparty
democracies and market economies); see also Gergana Noutcheva, EU Conditionality
And Balkan Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter? 1 (Apr. 17, 2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author) (reporting that the
incentives provided by EU membership stimulated reform in the establishment of
liberal democracies and market economies during the transition period for Western
Balkan countries).
71. See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 1 (indicating that despite belonging to Europe
geographically, the Western Balkans have been labeled as the ‘black hole’ of the
continent); see also Gaelle Perio, EU-Western Balkan Relations: The European Bermuda
Triange?, EUROPEAN ISSUE (Feb 20, 2011), at 6, available at http://www.robertschuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-195-en.pdf (arguing that the Balkans are
the ‘black hole’ and cause of problems within the European Union).
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perform a balancing act whereby its priorities of stabilization
and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans were weighed
against the individual state competition created by the SAP, as
only states that worked to conform and meet the requirements
for accession moved forward in the accession process. 72
Conditionality became the European Union’s instrument of
choice in achieving this balance, and the cornerstone of the
SAP.73
While adopting the European Union acquis was sufficient to
ensure membership during the first four Western Europe
enlargements, the EU enlargement strategy became even more
stringent toward the Western Balkan countries, with
conditionality taking the form of a “carrot and stick” policy.74
The guaranteed access to different SAP stages provided
powerful incentives for compliance with the political and
economic conditions.75 The European Union also believed that
conditionality alongside the Copenhagen criteria would allow
72. See Jacques Rupnik, The Balkans as a European Question, in THE WESTERN
BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’ 17, 20 (Jacques Rupnik ed., 2011)
(recognizing that the question of whether the European Union can develop a coherent
regional approach relates back to the debate on the regional priorities of the Stability
Pact versus the individual competition encouraged by the SAP); see also Atanasova,
supra note 51, at 1 (juxtaposing two dimensions of the European Union approach
towards the Western Balkans, namely, the European Union’s role as a soft arbiter
focused on mediation and conflict resolution in the region and the prospect of
membership offered to Western Balkan countries).
73. See Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (analyzing conditionality as it is applied to
Western Balkan countries by the European Union); see Tina Freyburg & Solveig
Richter, National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the
Western Balkans 1 (Nat’l Ctr. Competence Res., Working Paper No. 19, 2008) (affirming
that conditionality is aimed to induce behavioral adaptation by the applicant Western
Balkan countries in response to incentives offered by the European Union); see also
Elbasani, supra note 5, at 299 (identifying conditionality as the “very ‘cement of the
SAP’”).
74 . See Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (defining positive and negative
conditionality as the “carrot and stick” policy employed by the European Union in
achieving its objectives in the Western Balkan countries); see also Pogace, supra note 50,
at 10 (noting that conditionality has been engraved into the Copenhagen criteria by
providing incentives or restraints for candidate states to become EU Members).
75. See Trauner, supra note 4, at 7 (commenting on the fact that access to
different stages of the SAP provides an incentive for Western Balkan countries to
comply with EU conditionality); see also Zuokui, supra note 50, at 83–84 (identifying EU
membership, trade preferences and participation in programmes as some of the
benefits Western Balkan countries derive from satisfying political and economic
conditions).
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the Commission to impartially assess a candidate country’s
compliance and thereby result in merit-based accession.76
The unique social, economic, and political character of the
Western Balkan region, along with its reputation as a source of
organized crime, unwanted migrant labor, and other problems,
seems to shed light on the development of the SAP and SAAs as
a key part of the accession process for Western Balkan countries.
II. PLACING IT ALL IN CONTEXT: ACCESSION IN CROATIA
AND ALBANIA
Part II analyzes the application of both the SAP and the
Copenhagen criteria to candidate countries by closely
examining the process in two Western Balkan countries, Croatia
and Albania. Part II.A provides a brief overview of the benefits
derived from the accession for both the European Union and
the Western Balkan countries. It further examines Croatia’s
accession process and juxtaposes it with Albania’s accession
process in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the
accession criteria and SAP as applied.
A. Balancing Mutual Benefits
An analysis of the accession process for Western Balkan
countries gives rise to the question of why a Western Balkan
country would want to embark upon such a lengthy process?
What is gained? For Western Balkan countries, participation in
the accession process and EU membership carries geopolitical
and economic benefits that are difficult to overlook. 77 From
2007 to 2013, over the span of just six years, the Western Balkan
76. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 23 (arguing that the Copenhagen criteria and
EU’s conditionality were used to introduce a system on the basis of which the
Commission could impartially assess a candidate country’s compliance with its
conditions and criteria); see also Zuokui, supra note 50, at 92 (affirming that the
European Union emphasizes the objectivity of conditionality that the Commission must
apply to all candidates equally and at all times).
77. See Bartol Letica, Europe’s Second Chance: European Union Enlargement To Croatia
And The Western Balkans, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 209, 215 (2004) (indicating that
applicant states want to join the European union because of the economic and
geopolitical benefits that come with membership); see also Qerimi, supra note 61, at 46
(explaining that the first motivation for Western Balkan countries to join the European
Union was the desire to change to pluralist democracies and have access to economic
benefits).
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candidate countries received close to EU€12 billion in funding
through the IPA program to help in institution building, crossborder cooperation, and rural, regional, and cross-border
development. 78 The visa liberalization process, which allowed
visa-free travel to the European Union, is another benefit
derived from the accession process and employed by the
European Union to incentivize the strengthening of reform
efforts.79 The European Union also offers a political security
dimension, which allows leaders in candidate countries to
implement changes, such as introducing new legislation that
would otherwise be domestically unpopular. 80 Moreover, EU
membership enables the Western Balkan countries to
disentangle themselves from the past by giving them a sense of
belonging within Europe.81
The benefits that flow from Western Balkan membership
are also advantageous to the European Union. The Western
Balkan countries are considered the European Union’s
“backyard” and have strong economic and social ties to other
78. See European Commission, Overview—Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014) (providing an overview of the IPA, its purpose and its legal basis); see
also 2011 ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ENLARGEMENT 5, (2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/
2011_ipa_annual_report_with_annex_new_en.pdf (discussing the IPA as applied to the
Western Balkan countries).
79. See Florian Trauner, EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans:
Conflicting Objectives in the Pre-Accession Strategy 1, 14 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Stud., Working
Paper No. 259, 2007) (noting the European Union’s use of visa liberalization to effect
change in the Western Balkan countries); see also Igor Stiks, The European Union and
Citizenship Regimes In the Western Balkans, in THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE
HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 123, 129 (explaining the importance of visa
liberalization for the European Union and how it is employed towards the Western
Balkan countries).
80. See Mustafa Turkes & Goksu Gokgoz, The European Union’s Strategy Towards the
Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?, 20 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 659, 665 (2006)
(noting that security plays an important role in motivating candidate countries to join
the European Union); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 216 (explaining that EU
membership allows leaders of Western Balkan countries to implement changes that
would not garner popular support and also insulates them from bureaucratic and
interest group pressures).
81. See Letica, supra note 79, at 216 (explaining the symbolic value of belonging
that joining the European Union carries for Western Balkan countries); see also Turkes
& Gokgoz, supra note 82, at 664–65 (observing the desire of individual Western Balkan
countries to dissociate themselves from their past and “rid themselves of the dreaded
name ‘the Balkans’”).
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Member States.82 Without control over the region, this can have
a negative spillover effect that can compromise the Union’s
security and stability. 83 Thus, through the integration of the
Western Balkan countries, the European Union can avoid the
shame of losing its sphere of influence and geo-strategic
position, increase its international presence, and simultaneously
preserve its community-based identity.84 Moreover, the Western
Balkans house the most pro-Western Muslim and secular
communities in Europe and the Islamic world, providing both
geopolitical and economic benefits. 85 From the European
Union’s standpoint, conditionality in the accession process can
be translated into a formula that benefits both the Western
Balkan countries and the European Union: compliance with the
European Union’s requirements equals new perquisites for the
Western Balkans which in turn equals better control over the
region and less problems for the European Union.86

82. See Adam Balcer, Putting European House in Order: The EU and the Western
Balkans, in IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM: THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU
INTEGRATION 7, 21 (2013), available at http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/
demos_paradigm.pdf (emphasizing the geographical proximity and the close links
between the Western Balkans and the European Union); see also Noutcheva, supra note
72, at 234 (noting the Western Balkan’s geographical location as the European Union’s
backyard).
83. See Balcer, supra note 82, at 21 (highlighting the potential for a domino effect
from the Western Balkan countries that can destabilize the European Union); see also
Noutcheva, supra note 72, at 234 (stating that the European Union is most interested in
maintaining security and stability).
84. See Noutcheva, supra note 72, at 2 (discussing the different reasons for
European Union’s enlargement policy); Perio, supra note 73, at 8 (indicating that the
European Union would not want to lose its sphere of influence over the Western
Balkans to the United States); see also Turkes & Gokgoz, supra note 80, at 666 (arguing
that the accession of the Western Balkan countries would increase the European
Union’s international presence).
85. See Balcer, supra note 82, at 22–23 (emphasizing that the importance of the
Western Balkans for the European Union derives from their large native Muslim
communities); see also Perio, supra note 73, at 8 (asserting the importance of the
multifariousness of religions and ethnicities in the Western Balkans for the European
Union).
86. See generally Zuokui, supra note 50 (explaining the impact of conditionality on
economic, political and legal reform in Western Balkan countries); Elke Thiel,
European Integration of Albania: Economic Aspects 1 (Bamberg Econ. Res. Grp., Working
Paper No. 49, 2004) (stating that although EU membership may be the ultimate goal,
the accession process is what brings the rewards).
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B. Case Studies: The Application of the Accession Criteria to Croatia
and Albania
In light of the foregoing discussion and the context it
provides, this Part examines the EU accession process in two
Western Balkan countries, Croatia and Albania.87 An analysis of
Croatia, which was the first Western Balkan country to
successfully complete the SAP and become an EU Member
State, provides a fuller understanding of the Western Balkan
accession process from inception to completion.88 This process
is then compared to Albania’s ongoing accession. The
comparison between the two countries serves to highlight the
effect that the requirements under the SAP and the policy of
conditionality has had in significantly slowing down the overall
process for Western Balkan countries.89

87. See supra Part I.B and Part II.A and accompanying notes.
88. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 8–12 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1: Timeline Comparing Croatia and Albania’s EU
Accession Process
Date
November
2000
October
2001
January
2003
February
2003
June 2003
April 2004

June 2004

February
2005
October
2005

June 2006
April 2009

Key Stages for Croatia
Key Stages for Albania
SAP is launched by the EU as the policy to govern
accession for the five countries of South-Eastern
Europe (the Balkan countries)
Croatia and the EU sign
the SAA
Negotiations for SAA
between Albania and
EU launched
Croatia submits formal
application for EU
membership
Thessaloniki European Council confirms the
application of SAP and SAAs to the Western Balkan
countries
Commission issues positive
opinion on Croatia’s
application for EU
membership
Croatia obtains the status
of candidate country and
the Council sets entry
negotiations to begin in
2005
SAA for Croatia enters
into force
ICTY confirms Croatia’s
cooperation, screening
stage of accession
negotiations begins and
accession negotiations are
launched
Albania and the EU
sign the SAA
SAA for Albania
enters into force and
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Albania submits
application for EU
membership
June 2011

October
2011

December
2011

Accession negotiations
formally end for Croatia –
last of 35 negotiated
chapters is closed meaning
Croatia implemented the
acquis communautaire and
was ready to undertake the
obligations of EU
membership
Commission adopts
favorable opinion of
Croatia’s accession to the
EU and issues last progress
report
Croatia and the 27 EU
Member States sign the
EU Accession Treaty

June 2012

Commission issues
opinion on Albania’s
application for EU
membership and lays
out 12 key priorities to
be fulfilled in view of
opening accession
negotiations
Commission
recommends that
Albania be granted
candidate status

October
2012
July 2013
December
2013

Croatia joins the EU
EU Member States
vote to postpone
decision on whether
to grant Albania
candidate status until
June 2014
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C. Croatia’s Road to the European Union
Having declared its independence from the Yugoslav
Federation in 1991, Croatia’s sovereignty and the process of
state-building were afflicted by a number of tribulations.90 For
Croatia, EU membership was not only viewed as the best means
of escaping the regional and national problems facing a newly
independent country, but also as a return to Europe.91 From the
outset, Croatia was a frontrunner for EU membership in the
Western Balkan region because of its developed economy,
stronger institutional framework, and more stable political
environment. 92 It maintained this positive trajectory toward
member status by signing an SAA in October 2001, and formally
applying for membership shortly after on February 21, 2003.93
The European Union also appeared keen to make Croatia a
member, granting Croatia candidate status just one year after its
application for membership. For Albania, on the other hand,
even a four-year time lapse was insufficient to obtain candidate
status. 94 This momentum, however, came to an abrupt halt on
March 16, 2005, a day before the scheduled commencement of
accession negotiations, when the Commission concluded that
Croatia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
90 . See Jovic, supra note 7, at 205 (discussing Croatia’s declaration of
independence, its limited sovereignty and subsequent problems); see also Noutcheva,
supra note 72 (explaining the aftermath of the dissolution of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia).
91. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 206 (explaining that Croatians emphasize the
European roots of national identity and saw EU membership as a way of “‘departing
from the Balkans’ and ‘returning back home’”); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 216
(highlighting that besides the economic and geopolitical benefits, EU membership
held a symbolic value for Croatia because it proved that they belonged to Europe).
92. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 3 (stating that the SAA
between Croatia and the European Union was signed in October, 2001 and providing
timeline for subsequent steps towards accession); see also Trauner, supra note 4, at 10
(providing a brief description and timeline of Croatia’s accession process).
93. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 3 (stating that the SAA
between Croatia and the European Union was signed in October 2001 and providing
timeline for subsequent steps towards accession); see also Trauner, supra note 4, at 10
(providing a brief description and timeline of Croatia’s accession process).
94. See European Commission, Key Findings on the 2011 Progress Report on Croatia 2,
MEMO/11/688 (Oct. 12, 2011) (providing key dates for Croatia’s accession process);
see also Florian Trauner, EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans:
Conflicting Objectives in the Pre-Accession Strategy 8 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Stud., Working
Paper No. 259, 2007) (noting that the Council granted Croatia the status of candidate
in June 2004).
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for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was insufficient.95 The ICTY,
a body created by the United Nations to try leaders of genocide
and war crimes, reported that for over four years Croatia failed
to extradite the fugitive General Ante Gotovina, who was
indicted for war crimes. 96 The European Union, therefore,
conditioned Croatia’s accession on cooperation with the ICTY,
separate and aside from its satisfaction of the traditional
Copenhagen criteria, pursuant to the added requirements for
accession imposed by SAAs under the SAP.97
Croatia had difficulty meeting the political component of
the Copenhagen criteria amid the added conditional
requirements imposed by the EU and allowed by the SAP.98 Not
only was Croatia required to comply with the traditional
Copenhagen political criteria, but also had to comply with the
additional requirements under the SAA of cooperation with the
ICTY and regional cooperation with other Western Balkan
states. 99 These additional political conditions generated
considerable domestic resentment in Croatia where many saw
mandatory cooperation with the ICTY as an EU attack on

95. See Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (asserting that the start of accession talks for
Croatia’s was delayed because EU Members believed that Croatia was not cooperating
sufficiently with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
in apprehending a war suspect); see also Bechev, supra note 49, at 40 (stating that failure
of the Croatian government to cooperate with the ICTY resulted in the postponement
of membership negotiations).
96. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 10 (pointing out that the extradition
of General Ante Gotovina was the crucial case for Croatia’s compliance with the ICTY
criterion); see also Letica, supra note 79, at 221 (positing that the “case of General Ante
Gotovina became the ultimate measure of Croatia’s cooperation with the Tribunal”).
97. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 3 (emphasizing that the
European Union will apply fair and rigorous conditionality towards applicant countries
especially with regards to cooperation with the ICTY); see also Freyburg & Richter, supra
note 75, at 10 (indicating that the Council decided to schedule accession talks with
Croatia on condition that they fully comply with the ICTY).
98 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (discussing the requirement for
cooperation with the ICTY under the political criteria); see also 2005 Enlargement
Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 20 (indicating under the political criteria for
membership that problems arose with Croatia regarding the requirement of full
cooperation with the ICTY).
99 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (discussing the requirement for
cooperation with the ICTY under the political criteria); see also 2005 Enlargement
Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 20 (indicating under the political criteria for
membership that problems arose with Croatia regarding the requirement of full
cooperation with the ICTY).
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Croatia’s sovereignty and national identity. 100 The European
Union sent a clear message in response—it valued the
conditionality that it was allowed under the SAP and an
applicant country’s failure to comply would bring the accession
process to an abrupt standstill.101
As for the traditional Copenhagen political criteria, from
an early stage in the accession process the Commission
concluded that Croatia was a functioning democracy with stable
institutions that guaranteed the rule of law.102 Croatia continued
to have free and fair elections and respected fundamental
human rights.103 Yet, throughout Croatia’s accession process, the
protection of minorities, especially the Serbs and Roma, and the
implementation of agreements with the force of law that
facilitated the return of Serb refugees, were flagged as areas for
political improvement.104 Further, issues with the judicial system

100. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 11 (characterizing the Croatian
protests to cooperation with the ICTY as “‘attacking the sovereignty of the Croatian
state,’ ‘insulting the Croatian identity‘,’ and ‘defaming the holy homeland war’”); see
also Jovic, supra note 7, at 205 (observing that since Croatia declared its independence,
many felt that its sovereignty had been very limited by its obligations towards the ICTY).
101. See Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75, at 9 (noting that the European Union
consistently followed a policy of conditionality regarding cooperation with the ICTY
where non-compliance was a ‘knock-out’ criterion for membership); see also 2005
Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 6 (emphasizing that the “sustained full
cooperation with the ICTY will remain a requirement for progress throughout the
accession process” and that “[l]ess than full cooperation with ICTY at any stage will
affect the overall progress of negotiations and could lead to the suspension of the
negotiations”).
102 . See European Commission, Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of
Accession Negotiations 1, IP/04/507, at 1 (Apr. 20, 2004) (indicating that Croatia met the
democracy and rule of law elements of the Copenhagen political criteria); see also
Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (noting that Croatia was considered by the Commission
a functioning democracy with functioning institutions that guarantee the rule of the
law).
103. See Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of Accession Negotiations, supra
note 102, at 1 (indicating that Croatia met the elements of the Copenhagen political
criteria); see also Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (noting that Croatia was considered to
have met some aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria).
104. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 8–13 (assessing Croatia’s
compliance with the human rights and the protection of minorities requirement of the
Copenhagen political criterion); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note
52, at 5 (asserting that Croatia needed to make additional efforts in improving the
situation of minorities and facilitate the return of refugees).

2014]

FROM RAGS TO RICHES

1711

and the fight against corruption were among the criteria
demanding the greatest reform.105
Despite its initial setback in satisfying the Copenhagen
political criteria and the additional requirements under the
SAP, Croatia eventually cooperated with the ICTY and began
accession negotiations. 106 Croatia also established bilateral
relations with neighboring countries and took regional
initiatives as evidence of its regional cooperation. 107 Progress
under the political criterion was short-lived, however, and in
December 2008, the negotiation process was stalled for ten
months when neighboring Slovenia, an EU member, blocked
Croatia’s accession due to a dispute over the maritime border in
the Gulf of Piran.108 Since a single EU Member State has the
power to halt EU accession of candidate countries, it was not
until September 2009 that Slovenia decided to allow accession
negotiations to continue and detach the border dispute from
Croatia’s EU membership bid.109
105 . See Marktler, supra note 20, at 360 (documenting the Commission’s
recommendation that Croatia increase its efforts to fight against corruption and reform
the judicial system); see also Croatia: Commission Recommends Opening of Accession
Negotiations, supra note 104, at 2 (indicating that Croatia needs additional efforts in the
field of judicial reform and fight against corruption).
106. See Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that accession talks with Croatia
opened in October 2005 upon determination by the European Union that Croatia was
in full compliance with the ICTY); see also 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note
52, at 21 (indicating that in October 2005 the Council decided to move forward with
accession negotiations after concluding that the condition for cooperation with the
ICTY had been met by Croatia).
107. See 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that Croatia
had made good progress on regional cooperation in terms of regional initiative and
bilateral relations with neighbors); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28,
at 13–16 (discussing Croatia’s progressing in meeting the regional issues and
international obligations requirement under the Copenhagen political criteria).
108. See Elitsa Vucheva, Slovenia to Block Croatia EU Accession Talks, EUOBSERVER,
Dec. 18, 2008, http://euobserver.com/enlargement/27314 (reporting that Slovenia
blocked Croatia’s accession talks due to a long-running border dispute between the two
countries); see also Archick, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that Croatia’s accession talks
were stalled in December 2008 when EU Member Slovenia began blocking negotiations
because of a border dispute).
109. See Slovenia Unblocks Croatian EU Bid, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2009) http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8250441.stm (informing that Slovenia decided to lift its block on
Croatia’s accession bid in September 2009); see also Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, A House of
Cards? Building the Rule of Law in the Balkans, in THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU:
‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 145, 167 (noting that Slovenia’s blockade of
Croatia’s EU accession efforts ended in September 2009).
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For the most part, Croatia avoided similar tribulations in
meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria because gross
domestic product (GDP), inflation, unemployment, literacy and
life expectancy data indicated that Croatia was almost twice as
developed as other Western Balkan countries and more
developed than some EU members.110 As a functioning market
economy, Croatia was able to achieve a considerable degree of
macroeconomic stability, low inflation, and a developed
infrastructure and labor force. 111 While the Commission did
require certain specific added economic reforms for Croatia,
particularly regarding its high external indebtedness, weak
judicial and administrative structures, unemployment, and slow
privatization, Croatia took affirmative steps to act on these
required changes. 112 For example, Croatia made progress in
containing the rising deficit and stabilizing the gross external
debt. 113 As a result, the Commission concluded that Croatia
would be able to cope with competitive pressures and market
forces within the European Union if it continued its reform and
removed any lingering weaknesses.114
110. See Letica, supra note 79, at 217 (stating that Croatia was more developed in
all key economic indicators than the Western Balkan countries and the new members
joining the European Union in May 2004); see also Rupnik, supra note 74, at 21
(emphasizing that based on economic performance Croatia could have joined the
European Union with Romania and Bulgaria in 2007).
111. See European Economy, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that Croatia is a
functioning market economy maintaining an appropriate macroeconomic policy and
low inflation); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 16–23 (reporting
on Croatia’s progress in meeting the requirements under the functioning market
economy aspect of the Copenhagen economic criteria).
112. See Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s State of
Preparedness for EU Membership, at 5, COM (2012) 601 final (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter
Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership] (providing a summary of Croatia’s
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria and highlighting the areas
requiring continued reform); see also European Economy, supra note 32, at 6–10
(reporting on the need for continued structural reforms and privatization).
113. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 116, at 5
(noting Croatia’s development in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria); see also
European Economy, supra note 32, at 6–10 (discussing the Copenhagen economic
criteria for Croatia).
114 . See European Economy, supra note 32, at 10 (indicating that the
implementation of structural reforms would enable Croatia to cope with competitive
pressures and market forces within the European Union in the near term); see also
Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 114, at 5 (restating that
structural reforms would enable Croatia to cope with competitive pressures and market
forces within the European Union in the near term).
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Croatia also demonstrated that it was capable of taking on
the legal obligations of EU membership by adopting and
implementing EU legislation to align itself with the acquis.115
From an early stage Croatia was able to implement EU
legislation into its national legal system, specifically in the areas
of freedom of movement for workers, company law, intellectual
property rights, financial services, economic and monetary
policy, statistics, trans-European networks, science and research,
education and culture, as well as foreign security and defense
policy.116 Yet, even after accession negotiations were closed and
Croatia was deemed to have met all of the conditions set in
negotiation, a few outstanding issues remained.117 These issues
pertained to the acquis chapters dedicated to the right of
establishment and freedom to provide services, agriculture and
rural development, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary
policy, fisheries, regional policy and coordination of structural
instruments, and environment. 118 Additionally, the European
Union required Croatia to reform its tax regime to finalize the

115. See, e.g., Croatia 2005 Progress Report, at 48–109, SEC (2005) 1424 (Nov. 9,
2005) (listing all the acquis chapters that were negotiated for Croatia and the
Commission’s assessment for each chapter); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra
note 28, at 25-65 (providing the acquis chapters and Croatia’s progress in each
chapter).
116. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 15
(providing a summary of all the acquis chapters where the Commission deemed Croatia
to have met its commitments and requirements); see also Enlargement Strategy and
Main Challenges 2011-2012, at 34-38, COM (2011) 666 final (Oct. 12, 2011)
(summarizing the progress made by Croatia in meeting the benchmarks for each acquis
chapter).
117. See Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 5
(noting that although Croatia continued to make progress in adopting and
implementing EU legislation, the Commission identified a number of issues requiring
further attention by the date of membership); see also Monitoring Report on Croatia’s
Accession Preparations, at 10 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/20120424_report_final.pdf (indicating that
although Croatia had achieved a good level of alignment in most acquis chapters a
limited number of issues still remained).
118. See Monitoring Report on Croatia’s Accession Preparations, supra note 117, at 11–
12 (providing a brief description of all the acquis chapters assessed by the Commission
as needing increased efforts on Croatia’s part); see also Croatia’s State of Preparedness
for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 35–38 (summarizing the Commission’s
evaluation of Croatia’s progress in meeting the benchmarks for each acquis chapter).
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restructuring process for its national shipyards, pursuant to its
specific obligations under its SAA.119
Croatia and the EU Member States signed an Accession
Treaty on December 9, 2011, after Croatia substantially adopted
the acquis and concluded negotiations regarding the satisfaction
of the remaining obligations under the SAA and the
Copenhagen criteria.120 Article 36 of this treaty required the
Commission to provide six monthly progress assessments on
Croatia’s efforts to implement the remaining negotiated
commitments. 121 Finally, Croatia became a Member of the
European Union on July 1, 2013, after all remaining SAA
obligations and outstanding Copenhagen criteria were met and
the treaty was ratified by the national parliaments of all
Members States.122
D. Albania’s Road to the European Union
Despite being grouped with the former Yugoslavian states,
Albania’s accession experience varies from the process in
Croatia and presents and highlights the disparate effects that the
conditionality principle of the SAP can have on accession for
Western Balkan countries. Having been an independent and
sovereign state since 1912, Albania did not face the territorial
status and border-drawing conflicts that other former

119 . See European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Changes to
Restructuring Plan of Croatian Shipyard 3.Maj 1, IP/13/565 (Jun. 19, 2013) (reporting
that Croatia’s EU accession act provided for privatization of all shipyards in financial
difficulty before July 1, 2013); see also Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 4
(stating that Croatia brought its “tax regime on coffee into line with its SAA
obligations” and “complied with State aid rules in relation to the shipyards in
difficulty”).
120. See Monitoring Report on Croatia’s Accession Preparations, supra note 117, at 2
(indicating that accession negotiations with Croatia were closed as a result of Croatia
fulfilling all the benchmarks set in the negotiated chapters and the Accession Treaty
was signed by Member States and Croatia on December 9, 2011); see also Croatia’s State
of Preparedness for EU Membership, supra note 112, at 2 (specifying that after
accession negotiations with Croatia were closed and the Commission rendered a
favorable opinion, the Accession Treaty was signed on December 9, 2011).
121. Treaty of Accession of Croatia art. 36, Apr. 24, 2012, 2012 O.J. L 112/10.
122. See Croatia 2011 Progress Report, supra note 28, at 4 (specifying that after the
accession treaty is ratified by the present Member States and Croatia in line with their
constitutional requirements, Croatia becomes an EU Member on July 1, 2013); see also
Mahony, supra note 1 (noting that Croatia became an EU Member on July 1, 2013).
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Yugoslavian nations encountered. 123 Albania’s ethnic
homogeneity also allowed it to avoid the domestic inter-ethnic
problems that threatened the stability of other countries in the
region. 124 Particularly during the Kosovo crisis, Albania’s
restrained response in not waging war for the genocide of
Albanian-Kosovars by Serbia enabled it to largely elude the
threat posed to the country’s stability.125 Furthermore, Albania’s
governmental secularism contributed to the harmony between
its Islam, Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox religions.126
Despite these differences with Croatia and other
Yugoslavian nations, Albania began its accession process in early
2003, years after Croatia.127 Immediately after commencing SAA
negotiations, these discussions ceased because the Commission
expressed serious concerns about Albania’s political system and
its efforts in fighting corruption and organized crime.128 SAA

123. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 360 (noting that unlike the states that
emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Albania had been an independent state
and did not have the same territorial and border issues that faced its neighboring
countries); see also Pogace, supra note 50, at 4–5 (providing a brief history of Albania).
124. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 360 (explaining that Albania lacks interethnic problems because it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous unlike most
other countries in the region); see also About Albania, ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF.,
http://www.mfa.gov.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
5402%3Arreth-shqiperise&catid=46%3Arreth-shqiperise&lang=en (last updated July 12,
2010) (indicating that Albania’s population consists of ninety-five percent Albanians,
three percent Greek, and two percent other ethnicities).
125. See Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 361 (observing that during the 1999-2000
crisis in Kosovo, Albania’s response was decidedly restrained denying any interest in
pursuing unification with an independent Kosovo); see also O’Brennan & Gassie, supra
note 3, at 81 (noting Albania’s responsible attitude to regional issues such as the
Kosovo crisis).
126. See Albania Profile, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-17679574 (indicating that along with neighboring Kosovo, Albania has a
Muslim majority); see also Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 61 (explaining the history
behind Albania’s secularism and noting its role in maintaining peace among its
Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim groups).
127. See Croatia Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Jul. 24, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-17217954 (presenting a chronology of key events for Croatia); see
also Albania Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Sep. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-17681099 (providing a chronology of key events for Albania).
128. See Pogace, supra note 50, at 9 (recounting that SAA negotiations between
Albania and the European Union were frozen as the Commission expressed concerns
about Albania’s political process and its efforts in fighting corruption and organized
crime); see also Arolda Elbasani, EU Administrative Conditionality and Domestic
Downloading: The Limits of Europeanization in Challenging Contexts 16 (Kolleg-
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negotiations with Albania were not finalized until 2005, after the
Albanian Parliamentary elections brought the Democratic Party
into power.129 The SAA agreement between Albania and the
European Union was signed on June 12, 2006.130
The process was stalled for Albania due to the discretion
afforded to the European Union to condition accession on the
adoption of added political requirements. Albania did not meet
the specific political obligations imposed by the SAA over the
traditional Copenhagen criteria. It did not fulfill its SAA
obligations of electoral and judiciary reform shortly after it
signed the SAA and an agreement on visa facilitation because of
the political parties’ lack of cooperation and constructive
consensus. 131 The political stalemate that followed the 2009
elections led the Commission to conclude that, although a
democracy, Albania lacked effective and stable democratic
institutions.132
Albania faced political challenges that affected the
fulfillment of its SAA conditions and the Copenhagen criteria,
namely, needed reforms to the judicial system and the fight

Forschergruppe, Working Paper No. 2, 2009) (noting that the delay in concluding the
SAA negotiations was due primarily to irregular elections and political instability).
129. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that the political
transition brought by the 2005 elections led to the signing of the SAA between Albania
and the European Union); see also Elbasani, supra note 127, at 16–17 (describing the
2005 elections as an important political test for Albania in progressing with SAA
negotiations).
130. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3, at 65 (stating that the SAA agreement
for Albania was signed on June 12, 2006); see also Elbasani, supra note 127, at 16 (noting
the date that the SAA agreement was signed between Albania and the European
Union).
131. See Albania 2007 Progress Report, at 7, SEC (2007) 1429 (Nov. 6, 2007)
(reporting that “the political parties’ lack of will to cooperate continued to hold back
reforms needed to fulfill SAA obligations”); see also Enlargement Strategy Papers and Main
Challenges 2007-2008, at 20, COM (2007) 663 final (Nov. 6, 2007) (stating that
democratic culture and constructive dialogue between parties should be developed so
as to make the political system function effectively and transparently).
132. See Commission Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European
Union, at 5, COM (2010) 680 (Nov. 9, 2010) (reporting that the effectiveness and
stability of democratic institutions had not been sufficiently achieved by Albania in part
because of the confrontational and unconstructive dialogue following the political
stalemate of the June 2009 elections); see also Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges
2009-2010, at 22, COM (2009) 533 (Nov. 14, 2009) (noting that since the June 2009
elections, the cultural dialogue between the political parties deteriorated which
obstructed parliamentary work and delayed key reforms).
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against corruption and organized crime.133 Under the human
rights and protection of minorities obligations of the
Copenhagen criteria, Albania needed to address domestic
violence, ensure gender equality, prevent discrimination against
persons with disabilities and Roma minorities, and ensure the
independence of the media.134 Moreover, as was the case with
Croatia, Albania must satisfy the additional regional cooperation
condition under its SAA agreement. 135 The main political
roadblock in fulfilling this SAA condition remains the ratified
bilateral immunity agreement with the United States. 136 This
treaty grants exemptions from the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and does not align with
the EU position.137
Furthermore, Albania’s economic plight posed a significant
challenge in its ability to meet the Copenhagen economic
criterion. Albania emerged from the communist regime of
repression and isolation as the poorest country in Europe.138
133. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 11–16 (emphasizing that
reform of the judicial system and fight against corruption and organized crime
continue to be key priorities that need greater reform on Albania’s part); see also
Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 19 (listing among the key priorities that
Albania must meet in order for accession negotiations to commence, reform to the
judicial system and fight against corruption and organized crime).
134. See Albania 2013 Progress Report, at 10–11, SWD (2013) 414 final (Oct. 16,
2013) (providing the Commission’s assessment of Albania’s efforts in meeting the
human rights and the protection of minorities aspect of the Copenhagen political
criteria); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 33 (noting the areas in
the field of human rights where Albania needs to make further progress).
135. Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the
European Partnership with Albania and Repealing Decision 2006/54/EC, Mar. 19, 2008,
2008 O.J. L 80/1.
136. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 23–24 (reporting on
Albania’s constructive role in regional cooperation and the problem posed by its
bilateral immunity agreement with the US exempting it from International Court of
Justice’s (“ICJ”) jurisdiction); see also Albania 2013 Progress Report, supra note 137, at
11–12 (noting that although Albania continued to play a constructive role in regional
cooperation it needs to align itself with EU’s position regarding Albania’s bilateral
immunity agreement with the US).
137. See Albania 2012 Progress Report, supra note 25, at 23–24 (stating that
Albania needs to align itself with the European Union position regarding the ICC); see
also Albania 2013 Progress Report, supra note 134, at 11–12 (reporting that Albania has
still to align itself with the European Union position regarding the jurisdiction of the
ICC).
138. See O’Brennan & Gassie, supra note 3 (noting that in the transition from
communism, Albania continued to be plagued by problems of chronic poverty, underdevelopment and corruption which among other things, made it the poorest country in

1718 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1683
Since then, Albania has made progress towards becoming a
functioning market economy by maintaining macroeconomic
stability and low inflation.139 The large public debt and budget
deficit along with high unemployment, however, produce a
vulnerable economy exposed to structural weaknesses
domestically and economic volatility globally.140 Albania needs to
address these structural weaknesses in order to cope with
competitive pressures and market forces within the European
Union and meet its Copenhagen economic criteria.141
Albania continues to enhance its ability to take on the
obligations of EU membership under the SAA and the
Copenhagen acquis criterion by aligning its state legislation with
the EU legislation. 142 Of the thirty-five acquis chapters
negotiated, Albania still needs to ensure the enforcement of
intellectual property rights, reform the energy sector, reinforce
environmental protection, and improve the fields of
employment and social policy, free movement of workers, and
Europe); see also Panagiotou, supra note 54, at 358–62 (describing the lasting effects of
the isolationist communist regime in Albania especially on the economy of the country
making it the poorest in Europe).
139. See European Commission, Key Findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania
2, MEMO/12/763 (Oct. 10, 2012), (indicating that Albanian economy maintained
macroeconomic and inflation stability and made progress towards becoming a
functioning market economy); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3,
at 33 (reporting that Albania made progress towards becoming a functioning market
economy and was able to maintain macroeconomic stability and low inflation).
140. See European Economy, supra note 32, at 49–56 (summarizing Albania’s
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria and highlighting some of the
challenges that Albania continues to face); see also Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014,
supra note 3, at 33–34 (setting forth the high budget deficit and increased public debt
along with high unemployment as some of the short-term priorities that must be
addressed to avoid economic vulnerability to structural weaknesses and global
economic volatility).
141 . See European Economy, supra note 32, at 49–56 (discussing Albania’s
progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria); see also Enlargement Strategy
2013–2014, supra note 3, at 33–34 (noting the structural weaknesses that Albania must
address in order to meet the Copenhagen economic criteria).
142. See Commission’ Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European
Union, at 8, COM (2010) 680 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Commission’ Opinion on
Albania’s Application] (establishing that the Commission evaluates Albania’s ability to
assume the obligations of membership through two indicators: the obligations set out
in the SAA and progress with the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of EU
acquis); see also Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, at 54, COM (2012)
600 final (Oct. 10, 2012) (assessing Albania’s progress in meeting the SAA conditions
and the Copenhagen acquis criteria).
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public procurement.143 The major challenge, however, remains
the inefficient implementation and enforcement of legislation
due to Albania’s limited administrative and judicial capacities.144
Although Albania still must implement specific changes to meet
the conditions imposed by the SAA and the traditional
Copenhagen criteria, it was recommended for candidate status
in 2013, after holding competitive and orderly parliamentary
elections.145
As a consequence of this recommendation, the Commission
conditioned candidate status on five key priorities drawn from
the SAA and Copenhagen criteria. These priorities, not imposed
on Croatia, included the continued implementation of public
administration reform, further efforts in reforming judicial
institutions, determined efforts in the fight against corruption
and organized crime, and reinforcement of human rights
protection and anti-discrimination policies.146 Despite satisfying
these specific obligations, imposed by virtue of the discretion
given to the European Union under the SAP and conditionality

143. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 34 (identifying the
acquis chapters where further efforts are needed on Albania’s part); see also
Commission’ Opinion on Albania’s Application, supra note 141, at 8–10 (summarizing
the Commission’s findings on the acquis chapters where Albania needs to undertake
additional efforts).
144. See Key Findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania, supra note 141, at 2
(emphasizing that “sustained efforts are needed to strengthen administrative capacity
for the implementation and enforcement of legislation”); see also Commission’s
Opinion on Albania’s Application, supra note 143, at 10–12 (specifying that Albania
needs considerable adjustments of the legal and institutional framework and significant
strengthening of administrative and implementation capacities).
145. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 18–19 (stating that the
elections of June 2013 were assessed as competitive and genuinely respective of
fundamental freedoms and the Commission recommended that Albania be granted
candidate status); see also Christina Vasilaki, Albania Progress Sufficient for Candidate
Status, Says the EC, NEW EUR. ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.neurope.eu/article/
albania-progress-sufficient-candidate-status-says-ec (noting that Albania finally received
a positive recommendation for candidate status from the Commission after the orderly
June parliamentary elections).
146. See Enlargement Strategy 2013–2014, supra note 3, at 20 (listing the key
priorities that Albania must satisfy before accession negotiations begin); see also Arta
Tozaj, European Commission Recommends Status for Albania, TOP CHANNEL, Oct. 16, 2013,
http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10170 (reporting that according to
the Commission, for Albania to open accession talks, it must fulfill five remaining
conditions).
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principle, the Council did not grant Albania candidate status.147
Many viewed this as the European Union turning a cold
shoulder to Albania, ultimately undermining the credibility of
the accession process. 148 Member States that voted against
Albania’s candidate status, on the other hand, argued that the
postponement was justified by the need for a longer history of
progress in meeting obligations, a record that was not required
for Croatia.149
Fellow Western Balkan country and EU member Croatia
supported the step forward for Albania, criticizing the slow
accession process.150 Croatia, which itself had a smooth accession
process despite having to satisfy obligations under its SAA, noted
that the imposition of conditional obligations appeared to be
more burdensome and significant for Albania than those
conditions imposed on Croatia.151 Although Albania offered the

147. See Kate Holman, Albania Deserves EU Candidate Status, EUOBSERVER, Dec. 16,
2013, http://euobserver.com/opinion/122466 (noting that despite Füle’s warnings,
Albania was not granted candidate status even though it satisfied its obligations); see also
Status Postponed to June, TOP CHANNEL (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.top-channel.tv/
english/artikull.php?id=10641 (reporting that the European Council postponed
granting Albania candidate status).
148. See Holman, supra note 147 (noting Albania got the European Union cold
shoulder again even though it deserved candidate status); see also Status Postponed to
June, supra note 147 (reporting that Albania’s candidate status was vetoed by Germany,
France, Great Britain, Netherlands, and Denmark).
149. See Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, LONDON
SOUTH EAST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.lse.co.uk/AllNews.asp?code=hom3d2xj
(reporting that the Netherlands explained its position regarding Albania as based on
the need for a longer track record of reform); see also David Cameron Backs EU
Enlargement, But Wants Tougher Immigration Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/12/20/european-union-davidcameron-immigration_n_4478432.html (noting that the United Kingdom favors
postponing talks with Albania for six months to “enable the country to start initial
reforms to make the country more compatible with its possible future union
partners”).
150. See Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra note 149
(reporting that Croatia supports Albania’s progress and has called for Albania to be
granted candidate status); see also Arta Tozaj, Dilemma for Albania’s Status, TOP CHANNEL
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10636 (stating
that Croatia initiated the letter for candidate status recommendations for Albania).
151. See Peter Tase, Eight EU Foreign Ministers Support Albania’s Candidacy, EURASIA
REVIEW NEWS & ANALYSIS (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.eurasiareview.com/15122013eight-eu-foreign-ministers-support-albanias-candidacy-oped/
(pointing
out
the
conditions imposed by the Commission on Albania); see also Serbia Expected to Get EU
Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra note 149 (stating that according to Croatia,
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same type of promise and ability for reform to meet the
Copenhagen criteria as Croatia, it was subject to a longer
accession process because of the Commission’s ability to
condition progress on meeting country-specific obligations.152
III. THE MAGIC WAND: AN EVALUATION OF THE ACCESSION
PROCESS
Part III engages in an in-depth analysis of European
Union’s current accession mechanisms and the present and
future effects those mechanisms have on candidate countries.
Part III.A evaluates the Copenhagen criteria and the policy of
conditionality as the two accession mechanisms employed in
assessing a candidate country for accession to the European
Union. Part III.B analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of the
accession mechanisms as applied and the impact they have on
the stability of a candidate country. Part III concludes that the
current accession mechanisms of conditionality and the
Copenhagen criteria are especially problematic when applied to
the Western Balkan countries and must be reconsidered if the
European Union’s policy of enlargement is to effectively expand
to the Western Balkan region.
A. An Evaluation of Current Accession Mechanisms: Conditionality
and the Copenhagen Criteria
Legal commentators have highlighted two variables that
affect the accession criteria and produce drawbacks to the
European Union’s regional approach to accession for Western
Balkan states—the asymmetrical relationship between the
European Union and candidate countries and the built-in
uncertainty of the accession process.153 This creates a system that
Albania has done everything necessary in accordance with the accession criteria to be
granted candidate status).
152. See Tase, supra note 151 (highlighting all areas where Albania has made
progress to meet the accession criteria and the additional conditions imposed by the
Commission); see also Serbia Expected to Get EU Membership Boost; Delay for Albania, supra
note 149 (noting that the conditions imposed on Albania are used by the European
Union to justify the fact that there are things that remain to be done).
153. See Grabbe, supra note 51, at 303 (arguing that the uncertainty in the criteria
and the asymmetry of power between the applicant country and the European Union
gives the European Union greater influence through the additional criteria);
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is ripe for exploitation, as the Commission is given wide latitude
to impose country-specific obligations without regard to
consistency in application of this process. 154 That said, any
imbalance of power might be negligible, as evidence shows that
candidate countries are not affected by this perception of the
European Union power.155 Additionally, commentators explain
that the uncertainty of the accession process is created by the
inconsistent application of the accession criteria and the
imposition of conditional obligations under country-specific
SAAs. This results in different considerations and requirements
for different candidate countries.156
B. Power Differentials and Asymmetrical Relationships
One notable criticism of the regional approach to the
accession process for Western Balkan countries is the power
imbalance between the European Union and candidate
countries. 157 Scholars argue that there is an asymmetrical
Kochenov, supra note 22, at 23 (asserting that “the enlargement process suffered from
the ambiguity of meaning and vagueness of the Copenhagen criteria”); see also Pogace,
supra note 50, at 10 (acknowledging the argument that the Copenhagen criteria cannot
serve as benchmarks during the integration process of candidate countries because
they are vague and incomprehensible).
154 . See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 6–7 (explaining how the asymmetric
relationship between the European Union and the applicant countries is created); see
also Grabbe, supra note 51, at 316 (arguing that the relationship between the European
Union and the candidate countries is one of “obvious asymmetry of interdependence,
and hence power”).
155. See Gergana Noutcheva, Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the
EU’s Normative Power in the Western Balkans 2 (Ctr. for Eur. Pol’y Stud., Working Paper
No. 274, 2007) (arguing that the European Union’s policy in Western Balkans “lacks a
strong normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with EU’s
demands” especially for sovereignty-related issues); Freyburg & Richter, supra note 75,
at 2 (analyzing Croatia to show that national identity significantly affects compliance
with EU conditions leading to inconsistent compliance with the accession criteria); see
also Noutcheva, supra note 72 (proposing that sovereignty is a critical intervening
variable which affects compliance with EU conditionality leading either partial, noncompliance or temporary compliance vulnerable to reversal).
156. See Kochenov, supra note 22, at 4 (providing Greece as an example of the
inconsistent application of the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality where the
Council disregarded the unfavorable economic assessment of Greece’s membership
application); supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the
Copenhagen criteria as vague and problematic because of its inconsistent application).
157. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text (setting forth the criticism
that the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality lead to a power imbalance between the
European Union and candidate countries).
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relationship between the European Union and a candidate
country that undermines the regional approach since the
European Union creates the accession rules and controls
conditionality without input from the candidate or oversight.158
The fairy godmother casts the spell and the poor girl must
conform to and be satisfied with the transformation she receives.
The Commission enjoys an autocratic role and is the only body
empowered to subjectively define, evaluate, and enforce the
accession criteria.159 Taking this power imbalance into account,
it is unclear how much weight the candidate countries assign to
the Commission’s conditions and requirements, or how effective
those requirements are in prompting reform. For example,
while Croatia complied with the Commission’s requirement to
cooperate with the ICTY, Albania was required but did not feel
pressured to withdraw from its bilateral immunity agreement on
the ICC with the United States irrespective of the consequences
it would have on its accession progress.160 The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (“FYRM”) provides another example.
Despite being the first country to sign an SAA and gain
candidate status in 2005, FYRM has yet to open accession
negotiations because it continually rejects the conditional
obligation to reach a mutually acceptable resolution to issues
with Greece over its name.161
While the power imbalance may not force applicant
countries into accepting conditions and obligations, the
imbalance does significantly affect the progress of accession
158 . See Atanasova, supra note 51, at 6–7 (explaining how the asymmetric
relationship between the European Union and the applicant countries is created); see
also Grabbe, supra note 51, at 316 (arguing that the relationship between the European
Union and the candidate countries is one of “obvious asymmetry of interdependence,
and hence power”).
159 . See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text (describing part of the
Commission’s role in the accession process, especially its power to evaluate candidate
countries based on criteria set out by the Commission in the progress report).
160. See supra notes 95–97, 106, 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing
Croatia’s eventual compliance with the ICTY and Albania’s persistence in maintaining
the bilateral agreement with the United States).
161. See Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012–2013, supra note 142, at 13
(providing a timeline of Macedonia’s accession process and noting its failure to resolve
the name issue with Greece); see also Key Findings of the 2013 Progress Report on the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, MEMO13/890 (Oct. 16, 2013) (presenting the key dates
in Macedonia’s accession process and emphasizing the need for a resolution regarding
the name issue with Greece in order for accession negotiations to open).

1724 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1683
negotiations.162 The Commission’s reports on the Copenhagen
criteria and the imposition of conditional obligations indicate
that conditionality has teeth and can be used to abruptly end
accession negotiations.163 This was especially true in the case of
Croatia when the European Union froze accession negotiations
to force compliance with the ICTY.164 Yet, the European Union
has not taken such forceful measures to ensure compliance by
Albania and Macedonia, which suggests an inconsistent
application of the principle of conditionality with serious
measures taken only for those countries that the European
Union wants to accede quickly.165
The greatest flaw of the accession process and the accession
process in general, however, is the lack of deadlines for each
condition imposed by the Commission. It is here that the power
imbalance becomes more apparent, as the Commission has
ample discretion to prolong the accession process whereas a
candidate country can do little to affect its timeframe.166 After
all, the spell from the fairy godmother is broken at midnight.
This is particularly apparent in the postponement of Albania’s
candidate status.167 The message sent by the postponement in
light of Albania’s compliance with the key reforms was not
“Albania did not earn candidate status” but “The European
Union is not ready or willing to grant Albania candidate status.”
The Enlargement Commissioner saw the decision as a blow to
Albania’s efforts in pursuing the far-reaching reforms and to the
credibility of the EU accession process itself.168 Albania’s case
provides an example of the great leverage the European Union
has in managing a candidate country’s progress towards
162. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
164 . See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying texts (describing the
Commission’s decision to put a stop to the accession process in order to compel
Croatia to cooperate with the ICTY).
165. See supra notes 135–36, 160 and accompanying text (describing Albania’s
decision to maintain its bilateral treaty with the US and Macedonia’s unresolved name
issue with Greece despite the Committees conditionality).
166. See supra Part I.B (discussing the accession process for Western Balkan
countries).
167. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (discussing the postponement
of Albania’s candidate status).
168. See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text (discussing the postponement
of Albania’s candidate status).
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accession in the absence of mandatory timeframes for specific
conditions.
Croatia provides another example of the European Union’s
ability to control the accession timeframe in cases where
favoritism is coupled with strong political and administrative
pressures. The Commission adjusted Croatia’s Progress Reports
to justify granting Romania membership before Croatia despite
Croatia’s greater progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen
criteria.169 In Croatia’s case, the Commission also modified the
criteria to include regional cooperation and cooperation with
the ICTY despite the fact that only the original Copenhagen
criteria is legally binding for EU membership.170
C. Copenhagen Criteria or Conditionality: Which is Most Important?
The crux of the criticism of the Copenhagen criteria
centers on its inherent vagueness.171 The Commission is left with
the discretion to evaluate and apply the Copenhagen criteria
and conditional obligations under the SAP, thus leading to
inconsistent considerations for each candidate country.172 The
resulting uncertainty stems from the overbroad criteria
purposely built into the accession process.173 In this fairytale of
accession, who other than the fairy godmother would
understand the spell?

169. See Viljar Veebel, Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles,
Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation, 3 STUD. TRANSITIONAL ST. &
SOCIETIES 3, 18–19 (2011) (comparing Croatia’s performance on accession criteria to
Romania’s performance based on objective qualitative measures and the Commission’s
assessment and concluding that despite Croatia’s better performance, the Commission
adjusted the progress report to justify political preferences and necessities); see also
Milada A. Vachudova & Aneta Spendzharova, The EU’s Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania After EU Accession, 2012 EUR.
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 13 (2012) (noting that Croatia outperformed Bulgaria and Romania
in a number of accession criteria).
170. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the additional regional
cooperation and cooperation with the ICTY requirements for Croatia).
171. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the
Copenhagen criteria as vague).
172. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the
Copenhagen criteria as vague).
173. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text (noting that uncertainty and
asymmetric relationship that develops as a result of the Copenhagen criteria’s
vagueness).
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While criticism of the inconsistency is not without merit,
reports indicate that the Commission has developed a more
technical system of conditions with measurable criteria and
assessment through years of application.174 This, in turn, gives
the Commission leeway in assessing and assigning conditions for
Western Balkan countries where the political, economic, and
judicial maturity and stability are uncertain.175 The transparency
and impartiality objectives of the process would be better served,
however, if more quantifiable guidelines replaced the broad
criteria currently in place.176
The prolonged accession process in Western Balkan
countries is the result of these additional, non-quantitative
criteria that lack fixed deadlines and are subject to the
Commission’s subjective assessment.177 As a consequence, it is
the intentional decision to establish broad accession criteria that
provides the Commission with control over the speed and cost
of the accession process while progress-based accession takes the
back seat.178 Thus the question arises: what is the primary factor
guiding the Commission’s assessment of a candidate country’s
progress, compliance with conditionality or the Copenhagen
criteria? Or, is it something else altogether?
The question stems in part from the fact that the system is
largely a compromise between the interests of individual EU
Member States. 179 While the European Union’s desire to
safeguard against any spillover of political, economic, or legal
problems arising from a speedy accession is understandable,

174. See, e.g., Albania 2007 Progress Report, supra note 133; Albania 2012 Progress
Report, supra note 25; Croatia 2005 Progress Report, supra note 114; Croatia 2011 Progress
Report, supra note 28 (providing examples of the Commission’s progress reports and
the criteria and conditions contained therein at different time periods).
175. See, e.g., Albania 2007 Progress Report, supra note 133; Albania 2012 Progress
Report, supra note 25; Croatia 2005 Progress Report, supra note 114; Croatia 2011 Progress
Report, supra note 28 (providing examples of the Commission’s progress reports and
the criteria and conditions contained therein at different time periods).
176 . See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that objectivity and
impartiality are the main objectives of the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality).
177. See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
179. See Veebel, supra note 169, at 9 (spelling out the different motivations and
interests guiding EU Member States in deciding the accession criteria); see also Grabbe,
supra note 51, at 15–16 (indicating that each EU Member State is guided by their own
interests therefore a candidate country faces uncertainty about whom to satisfy).
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how much power can a single EU Member State exert over the
process in order to protect its own interests?180
The uncertainty over what part of the accession criteria
controls, coupled with the indication that the subjective
conditions imposed on candidate countries can be manipulated
by Member States with grievances against an applicant country,
impedes the accession process and creates opportunity for
exploitation. The fact that an EU Member can bring the whole
process to a standstill, therefore, presents a problem that is
difficult to sidestep.
D. Failure to Reform: Present and Future Effects of Current Accession
Mechanisms
The mechanisms that frame the accession process, namely
conditionality and the Copenhagen criteria, serve as a platform
for EU Member States to discriminate against Western Balkan
countries. This discrimination is realized through the imposition
of additional and burdensome conditions and is made apparent
by the disillusionment suffered by candidate countries as they
attempt to avoid a drawn-out process without actually
implementing the necessary reforms.
The European Union’s regional approach to Western
Balkan accession can be best characterized as one of integration
through discrimination. The European Union’s goodwill
towards the Western Balkans is called into question as Western
Balkan countries are forced to resolve their issues prior to
gaining any prospective of membership. Paired with concern
over enlargement fatigue, 181 the process feeds into existing
stereotypes and perpetuates a cycle whereby the Western Balkan
countries cannot shed the label of Europe’s “black hole.”182 The
European Union, therefore, appears to hold these countries at
arm’s length, dangling the prospect of membership while
imposing a multitude of country-specific conditions that slow
this process, sometimes to a complete halt.
180 . See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying notes (discussing Slovenia’s
blockade of Croatia’s accession negotiations).
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the fear that following
Croatia’s accession, the European Union is suffering from enlargement fatigue).
182. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the image that has
developed of the Western Balkan countries as Europe’s black hole).
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Not surprisingly, research shows that as a candidate’s
country moves closer to accession, the popular support for EU
membership dwindles. In Croatia, public support dropped to
about sixty-six percent prior to EU membership, while in
Albania, public support for EU accession remained high.183 Yet,
the recent postponement of Albania’s candidate status calls this
assertion into question as the Albanian government has soured
on the process but is willing to go forward with the reforms.184 In
his national address on December 18, 2013, the Albanian Prime
Minister clearly showed that the conditions imposed in the
drawn-out accession process can create disillusionment in the
applicant country. 185 He noted the resistance within the
European Union towards further enlargement and cited the EU
economic crisis, unemployment, and immigration as real factors
that affected the rejection.186 In this regard, Albania resembles
the poor girl in the fairytale who realizes that the magic wears
off after a short while and is faced with the reality of returning to
a similar life when the spell breaks.
Once the supervised accession process trespasses on the
Western Balkan countries’ sovereignties, therefore, the
European Union cannot make a half-willed effort to push for
reform but must employ the power imbalance to effect change.
The Copenhagen criteria alone create a clear promise of
183. See Jovic, supra note 7, at 201–02 (presenting percentages for the fluctuation
in public opinion in favor of EU membership in Croatia culminating in the sixty-six
percent in favor of it during the referendum); see also Executive Summary, in THE
WESTERN BALKANS AND THE EU: ‘THE HOUR OF EUROPE’, supra note 72, at 7, 10 (noting
that the popular support for EU accession is strongest in Albania where it is least
advanced and weakest in Croatia where it is most advanced).
184. See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, TOP CHANNEL (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=10653&ref=fp (reporting on Prime
Minister Edi Rama’s response to EU’s postponement of Albania’s candidate status); see
also Statusi, Rama: Vendimi I BE, Rrit Vendosmerine Tone Per Reforma Te Thella,
http://www.balkanweb.com/bw_lajme2.php?IDNotizia=164018&
BALKANWEB,
IDCategoria=2685 [hereinafter Statusi] (noting the Prime Minister’s reaction to the
rejection of Albania’s candidate status).
185. See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, supra note 184 (providing a
summary of the Albanian Prime Minister’s speech); see also Statusi, supra note 184
(noting Albania’s response to the European Union’s decision to delay granting Albania
candidate status).
186 . See Rama: Verdict Makes Us More Determined, supra note 184 (reporting
Albania’s response to EU’s postponement of candidate status); see also Statusi, supra
note 184 (discussing the Albanian Prime Minister’s response to Albania being delayed
candidate status).
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accession because these elements are concrete, irrespective of
whether ultimate membership is a distant prospect with no
guarantees. The uncertainty inherent in the current accession
process, however, creates a risk that the Western Balkan
countries will lose their motivation, drive, and willingness to
work towards membership. Despite the benefits that the
accession process itself may bring, a drawn out process could
lead to partial or faked compliance especially for sovereigntyrelated issues.187 The result is one that the European Union is
familiar with: the candidate country will not complete the
required reforms and will continue to present problems once it
becomes a Member State.188
CONCLUSION
The drawbacks of the accession mechanisms employed by
the European Union become even more apparent in their
application to the Western Balkan countries. The asymmetrical
relationship between the European Union and candidate
countries and the uncertain weight assigned to conditionality
and the Copenhagen criteria raise important questions about
the effectiveness and future of the European Union accession
process. Salvaging the European Union enlargement policy may
require more than a re-evaluation of the accession process, it
may require actual reform.
The focus must also shift to the candidate countries and
their efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and the
benchmarks set for EU membership. Once the European Union
has infringed upon their sovereignty the push for reform must
be more vigorous. The promise of membership must be clear
and continuously reinforced and each benchmark should
contain reasonable timeframes for compliance that take into
187 . See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing partial or noncompliance with accession criteria and conditionality by candidate countries for
sovereignty-related issues).
188. See Vachudova & Spendzharova, supra note 169, at 1 (explaining that post EU
accession, corruption remains a substantial and unyielding problem for Bulgaria and
Romania); see also Christos T. Panagopoulos, Unemployment remains a major problem for
Croatia, INDEPENDENT BALKAN NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 19, 2013), http://
www.balkaneu.com/unemployment-remains-major-problem-croatia/ (reporting a rise
in unemployment rate in Croatia).
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account the realities of each candidate country. It is time for the
European Union to re-evaluate their accession process and
uphold the same principles they demand of candidate countries:
decentralization, accountability, and transparency.

